Admiral Max Horton (May 1945)

Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches

Royal Navy

May 1945

It has been two eventful years since I assumed the position of Commander-in-Chief for Western Approaches Command. In May of 1943, after a heated battle, I sent a victory signal which stated that the Battle of the Atlantic underwent a decisive change in our favour, and the climax of the battle had been surmounted.

This has proved to be the case. Since then, Doenitz has been on the run. We were able to close the gap through technology. Radar prevented the German type VII and IX U-Boats from surfacing, and their weak underwater speed and performance prevented them from dealing with our increasing number of escorts. We successfully used Ultra to penetrate German ciphers, and locate and destroy the U-boats. We remained ahead of the game with new technology, such as the "Squid" mortar, which fired larger depth charges than the Hedgehog. In cooperation with the Americans, shipbuilding also overtook the tonnage that we lost to our enemy.

While the Germans advanced in technology since 1943, with the schnorchel enabling the boats to inhale air while submerged, they were still unable to defend against our ships and our radar. Despite the death of Captain "Johnnie" Walker in 1944, the support groups still frustrated German attempts at attacking the convoys. Allied air patrols halted German attempts to reach Norway. The bombing program against Germany managed to destroy the Dortmund-Ems Canal and set the U-boat building program back in 1944, preventing the programme from completing its promised 131 U-boats. While the type XXI and XXIII U-boats were introduced earlier this year, they arrived much too late to make a difference. Doenitz's attempt at a last hurrah in April, using six Type IX schnorchel-equipped U-boats in a wolf pack (Seewolf), was foiled by Ultra. The US Navy greeted the wolf pack by sinking four of the six U-boats, forcing the other two to flee.

On May 4th, 1945, General-Admiral Hans Georg von Freideburg, acting as Doenitz's plenipotentiary, signed the surrender of all German forces in the north-west. As a result, submarine command requested that all boats cease offensive patrols. Doenitz subsequently sent out a message stating that a continuation of the fight was no longer possible, authorising unconditional surrender.

The tide turned in 1943, and the Allies have proven superior in industrial production, intelligence, weaponry, and strategy since then. Our only regret is that the war has ended without complete Allied mastery of the U-boat, as we were unable to conclusively defeat the latest U-boats at sea before the Germans surrendered.

We have won.

Photo - Admiral Horton inspects surrendered U-boat (May 1945)

Admiral Horton inspecting U-532. Escorted by German officer.

Captain Frederic "Johnnie" Walker (March 1944)

Commander of the Second Support Group

Royal Navy

March 1944

I am the leader of the Second Support Group, which succeeded in sinking six U-boats in 1943. Of all the battles I have experienced, the battle in January and February has been the most climatic of them all.

We managed to sink six U-boats in a single patrol, from January to February. The situation has changed drastically since 1943, and Doenitz's desperate attempts are utterly ineffective now. Our reinforcements arrived promptly after our convoy was sighted by the Germans, thanks to British intelligence. This enabled Coastal Command to send a squadron of Beaufighters to ward off German air-patrols, and dispatch more ships to protect the convoy and its escorts. The Germans were only able to sink two ships - one merchant ship, and HMS Woodpecker. However, all the crew of the Woodpecker were able to escape, and there was no loss of life.

Eleven U-boats were destroyed, six by the Second Support Group's hand. It was a resounding success. we were also able to gain intelligence about the new German innovation, the schnorkel. One of the U-boats (U264) which we attacked was fitted with a schnorkel. The commander, Hartwig Looks, was meant to submit a report about its effectiveness after the battle. We succeeded in capturing Looks and his crew after sinking U264, and he has since volunteered information about the schnorkel and other German technological developments to the Naval Intelligence Division, supplementing the knowledge gained from Ultra.

When we returned to Liverpool on the 25th of February, the whole port was full of cheering people - why, even the First Lord of the Admiralty was there to greet us! The Germans have suffered a terrible loss with this battle, and I think that this has been one of the decisive victories in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Since 1943, the Germans have been the underdog, and the tide has turned against them. Their actions do not stem from a position of naval supremacy, but are the result of their increasing desperation. From January to March, we have sunk thirty-six submarines in the Atlantic, and Doenitz is now pulling his U-boats back to defend the Reich because we have sunk so many. We are able to deliver food, fuel, and ammunition reliably. Our boys have come to describe the convoy route as a "milk run" because it is as routine and uneventful as a milkman's daily route.

Despite this resounding success and the withdrawal of many U-boats, I will not rest on my laurels, and I will ceaselessly strive to aid Britain in its victory. I believe that it is only a matter of time before the Germans will either collapse or surrender, and I will do my best to ensure this outcome.

Karl Doenitz, end 1943

The ONS- 5 onslaught had been the downfall for us. We are getting into real trouble now, and I am concerned at the amount of U- boats being sunk. We fight on, but there seem to be some serious problems ahead of us.

Signing off

Karl Doenitz, Commander in Chief, Kriegsmarine
late 1943

Lieutenant Commander R. E Sherwood (May 1943)

Mid-Ocean Escort Force group B7, HMS Tay

Escort of Convoy ONS-5

Royal Navy

May 1943

This battle has definitely marked the decline of U-boat supremacy in the Atlantic. The tide has been turned, and Doenitz will have a hard time recovering from the results of this confrontation! The convoy suffered the loss of twelve merchant ships out of forty-three. However, its escorts have managed to destroy six U-boats, and inflict severe damage on seven more U-boats. If we can repeat the successes of this battle, Doenitz will be forced to admit defeat by May!

But boasting does no good on its own, so I shall describe my actions in the battle.

Commander Gretton was commanding the HMS Duncan, but was forced to withdraw. The weather conditions were poor at that point in time - ONS-5 was travelling slowly, and the escort fleet was scattered. The difficulty of refueling in such poor weather also led Commander Gretton to take the HMS Duncan to refuel at St John's. Prior to that, Gretton had successfully driven off five U-boat attacks, and succeeded in damaging two U-boats, forcing them to return to base. I took over command of the escort fleet from Commander Gretton on the 3rd of May.

After I assumed command, the weather began to improve, and the convoy was able to pick up speed. Doenitz had called off his earlier attacks on ONS-5 due to poor weather conditions, instead choosing to focus on interception of the SC128 convoy. However, failure to detect SC128 caused him to turn his attentions to us, mobilising forty U-boats against ONS-5. Doenitz launched his attack on May 4th, but the corvette Pink was able to sink a U-boat and round up the stragglers in the convoy.

The assaults continued into the night of May 5th. By that time, the crews of the escorts were worn out from the dreadful weather and their lack of sleep, but they still managed to mount an assault against the U-boats. We succeeded in sinking four U-boats and damaging a few others. While the U-boats attempted to assault the convoy twenty-six times, every attempt failed. Doenitz was forced to break off the battle shortly after the reinforcements sent by Admiral Horton arrived on May 6th - HMS Pelican, the cutter Sennen, and the frigates Spey, Wear, and Jed.

Our victory in this battle was due to the hard work of the crews and Admiral Horton's incredible ability to strategise, but also due to our superior technology. The failure of the U-boats' twenty-six attempts can be credited to our radar. Vidette was able to detect and drive off three attackers due to its radar. After detecting the enemy with radar, our ships were able to use anti-submarine weapons against them. Depth charges enabled Snowflake to blow a U-boat to the surface. When the U-boat attempted to escape after being forced to surface, Vidette used the Hedgehog against the U-boat. The Hedgehog's small mortar bombs exploded promptly on contact, sending the U-boat to the bottom of the ocean.

Air support from our allies also aided the battle. The US Army sweeping the area and the Canadian air cover on May 4th helped to delay the U-boats from making initial contact with the convoy, and the depth charges from the Canadians succeeded in sinking U-630.

This battle has thoroughly dispelled the mystique of the Wolf Pack - this great success will be a turning point. The U-boats are no longer undefeatable. With our superior crews, technology, and intelligence, as well as the cooperation of the Americans and Canadians, we will be able to force Doenitz to turn tail and admit defeat in the Atlantic!

Photo - Rescued Allied seamen (ONS-5)

(click photo to enlarge)

German Naval Commentator, 1943

The convoy ONS 5 is giving us some real problems. This seems to be a major battle.

After our successful convoy battles in March, we had to return many U-boats back to ports for repairs and improvements. There may be code decryption by the British, and I seriously suspect so. On the 24 our great U-710 had been sunk by the air escort for the convoy. We are continuing to get hit hard and it seems like the enemy is making progress in anticipating and attacking our Wolf Pack. There may be a reversal in battle plans as our night attack strategy is being imitated by the allies. Thus we shall surface and strike in the day, but I doubt truly that this will produce any considerable results. Surface escorts only are defeating our U-boats! There is a serious fog problem as well, but this seems to be an issue that is commonplace in the areas of hot and cold gulf stream conflate. We are going to lose a few U boats here, for the first time in the war.

Corporal Parkinson Diary (April 1943)

Just got a letter from home. Uncle Ralph bought it. U Boat got him on one of those damned oil tankers, in some convoy fight somewhere in the middle of the ocean. Bastards never tell you what really happened. Mom in tears. Dont' blame her. Ralph was a great guy. She is still pissed at him for going back to sea, old as he is. Merchant Marine needs everyone they can get I guess. What the hell is wrong with the navy. Why can't they get on top of these Krauts? This just goes on and on.

Aldershot, 2 April 1943

Karl Doenitz (January 1943)

Karl Doenitz 

January 1943

Grand Admiral Raeder has phoned me and told me he wished to resign. He had proposed the names of myself and Admiral Carls as his possible successors. The great Fuehrer has appointed myself as new Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine.

Our position needs to improve if we are to win this war.

Decrypter of Kriegsmarine Transmissions (December 1942)

(name omitted for security purposes)

Decrypter - Kriegsmarine transmissions

Hut 8, Bletchley Park

December 1942

Since Admiral Karl Doenitz changed the Enigma ciphering procedures for the U-boats in February 1942, we hadn't been able to crack the new code. I can still remember my colleagues' expressions when I walked in after the change in ciphers. I asked them what happened, but they just shook their heads. We could intercept all the information we wanted, but we couldn't decrypt it. We knew this day was coming ever since we captured material about the development of the new Enigma machine, but we didn't know when it was going to hit us.

The new German ciphering machine (codename M4) used a four-rotor system, making the cipher much more complex than the previous three-rotor version. We gave the new cipher the codename "Shark", instead of "Dolphin", since it was so much stronger.

From then on, we've worked feverishly to crack this problem - the Kriegsmarine surface units and Baltic submarines still use the old three-rotor procedures, but the information we can glean from them has been very limited. The submarine trackers aren't able to get much information from us, and they have had to rely on agent reports, direction finding, and aerial reconnaissance. It's been a step backwards. Our automated keyfinding hasn't worked for ten months.

That was until three members of the HMS Petard succeeded in capturing one of the codebooks for weather reports in October. After that, we could work backwards to penetrate the new code using the plain-text from the codebooks.

Now we have broken the Enigma code again! We can decrypt German radio signals and send them straight to the Operational Intelligence Centre in London by teletype. The increase in German U-boats and the wolf pack tactics that they have adopted has also allowed us to intercept more radio signals, so we can decrypt their orders and reports.

Instead of locating individual submarines with direction finding, we can again take the fight back to the Germans by figuring out their plans and tactics.

We've been able to teleprint the positions of 10 U-boats to the Operational Intelligence Centre today, and there will be more to come tomorrow.

We are back on track. The Germans will have to look out.

Video - Cracking the Enigma Code

Frederick Kleist, Corporal, U-552 (November 1942)

Frederick Kleist

28 November 1942

U-552, with our emblem of the red devil with two torches signifying life and destruction has had a fantastic campaign so far. We were the first ones to get a US warship, the USS Reuben James, and we are glad that we are sinking tonnage well into the 100,000 tons range. I do have to say that I miss my family, and with the narrow miss the other day (We were attacked by an enemy submarine at the Cape Verde islands) it seems to be like we are not so invincible after all. However, the idiots had torpedoes running close to the surface and our commander obviously had the insight (though I would argue us men do more work than him) to turn away. This war seems to keep going on, and we are perpetually trying to make sense of the directives that Doenitz is giving. Oh well, let's hope we get more of the enemy scoundrels and return victorious to our Motherland.

Karl Doenitz (1942)

Karl Doenitz, 

late 1942

There can no longer be any doubt that even though we have made such considerable progress, the enemy is tactically gaining the upper hand with surface location by destroyers, escort vessels, and aircraft have deprived our tactical advantages. We need to transfer the submarines to a more appropriate under-water element-we need an approach where we have a high underwater speed submarine. We have been testing the high test peroxide turbines which are helping us, and on June 24 I had laid out very clearly that the new Walter U-boats must be speeded up and this is because the U-boats are qua boats, which means their faulty armaments leaves them in an inferior position. I wish to stress how importance of installing the Fu MB which are search receivers and they have afforded considerable relief! Let us push harder.

Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz (1942)

Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz,

1942

Our leaders have learned nothing from the first world war. We have plunged into a world conflict without adequate submarines and failed to expand the U-boat arm, because the leaders and their army and air force advisers believe that they can win a war on land when our main opponents are the two greatest sea powers in the world! We direly need technological improvement and more U-boats! Now that the US is in the picture, we are going up against a monolithic economy. Let's hope we can continue making gains, and hope the leaders honestly wake up to these concerns before it's too late.

Roger Smith, British Merchant Mariner (August 1941)

British merchant mariner

August 1941

We haven't been able to use our usual shipping routes to get to London ever since France fell. Everything has been thrown off schedule – the timings are so unpredictable that our men on the ground can’t even allocate manpower or handle the cargo reliably.

Ever since France fell, everything has to go through the North Channel, and those Germans are picking our vessels off once we head through there. Even convoys aren’t helping. It doesn’t matter if we’re escorted or unescorted, once we head through the North Channel those U-boats start chasing us like a pack of hungry wolves. In fact, the weather and the use of convoys recently has only slowed us down - we can only travel at seven knots when there's a storm, which gives the pack enough time to surround us. The convoys can’t protect merchant ships at night, and the U-boats have been increasing in number lately. It's estimated that there are 36 U-boats at sea every day, when there were only 24 in May. We've lost about 1200 British merchant ships from January to June this year, and we're losing around 260 000 gross register tonnes per month. Some of the escorts - particularly the Royal Canadian Navy fleets - aren't doing their job too. I was under the impression that the convoys were meant to protect the merchant ships, but the escort fleets keep haring off to chase and destroy U-boats, instead of protecting us.

What’s really worrying me isn't my survival, but the survival of our country. It is obvious that our country doesn't have enough ships. I used to think that Britain had a huge merchant fleet. Wasn’t that our pride? But ever since the Phoney War that hasn’t been the case. We’ve been losing ships to U-boats and the weather, and our shipyards aren’t capable of replacing them. Many young shipbuilders went over to the navy or military to do their duty. Three thousand workers from the core of our shipbuilding industry were called up for military service, and only five hundred of them returned to the industry last year. I've heard the news, the Ministry of Labour has recently announced that all of our industries should help the military, and blocked shipbuilders from deferring by subjecting them to military conscription.

Britain has had to purchase about a hundred obsolete secondhand ships from the United States to compensate for the shortfall in domestic production, but even these ships will eventually require repairs at the dockyards. What's going to happen once all the shipbuilders are conscripted? Are we meant to depend solely on American ships? Are we meant to trust the future of our great country's ships to people who haven't worked since the 1920s - cleaners, clerks, and manual labourers? The closest thing the dockyards have to skilled workers are house electricians and hand riveters. I wouldn't trust them to build anything that goes on the water.

Every time we set sail and the sun sets I think that this might be the time where I don’t come back. Between the U-boats, the dreadful weather, and the fickle escorts, I'm not sure which one will get me first. I just hope that our country can survive, even if I don't.

Video - U-Boat crew in French bases

(Note: Narration is in Russian.)

Adolf Hitler (March 1941)

Adolf Hitler, 

Fuehrer of the Third Reich, 

March 1941

I have just gotten news that Gunther Prien’s U-47 has been lost. This is a moment of sadness for us, as we have truly lost a great commander. Under him, the submarine sank 193,808 tons of enemy ships. Admiral Doenitz had labelled Prien’s achievements at Scapa Flow “the boldest of bold enterprises” and he is right. In Prien’s own words before the attack “I felt a tremendous tension within me. Would it be possible to bring it off? My common sense calculated and questioned the chances, but by will had already decided that it could be brought off. At home, supper was already on the table. Absentmindedly I greeted my wife and child, for my thoughts were obsessed with the single idea of Scapa Flow.” A national hero has been lost, for he truly lived the life of a true Nazi soldier, and put the love for the Reich before himself. My regards for the men of the Kriegsmarine and I urge all of you to fight on despite this news.

Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz (January 1941)

Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz,

January 1941

I am impressed by the work of our commanders. The U-boat arm is truly proving itself to be a first class service arm and it has so far and continues to sink considerable amounts of enemy tonnage. There are, however, I suspect, problems with our own torpedo systems. The current Mark G7a and Mark G7e models are really producing problems in terms of inadequate depth keeping, defective pistols and faulty detonators. Of course, we cannot merely place all the emphasis on just these factors to explain the problem. The Allies too have strategic manoeuvring that has produced good avoidance from our attacks. There are too the problems of having the anti-sonar Oppanol coating that has serious adhesive problems on the hulls of the U-boats, which have been causing them to not work as effectively as usual in disguising their acoustic signatures. We have to, and it is absolutely imperative, find better technology to suit the U-boats. This will make us even more decisive in winning this war. I am glad to see the Wolf Pack tactics are honestly causing real damage to the other side however, and we must be strong and last through the arduous months which are to follow with skirmishes bound to occur much like the eternal and unchanging expanse of the sea.

Vice Admiral Max Horton (December 1940)

Commander of Home-Based Submarines

Royal Navy

December 1940

Speaking as a man who has known submarines for years, due to my prior experience in World War I, I will make my recommendations regarding the problem of the German U-boat fleet in the Atlantic.

Simply put - we need to rethink our resource allocation regarding the Atlantic before the situation becomes unmanageable.

The "ten year rule", which bases our spending on the assumption that Britain will not have to fight a major war for ten years, has led to inefficient resource allocation. We have focused on our battle fleet, while neglecting the possibility that there would be an attack on merchant shipping. Most of our vessels are designed for coastal work, not convoy work, due to this misallocation.

The Town class, as well as the V and W class destroyers that we are repurposing for escort duties have too many guns, and cannot turn properly due to the length of their hulls, decreasing their maneuverability. Similarly, our aircraft are not trained for anti-submarine warfare, due to the Navy's prior focus on fighting a surface fleet instead of a fleet of U-boats. If we want to combat the U-boats, the Navy will have to expand its anti-submarine forces rapidly and immediately. We have been protecting our shipping with sloops, destroyers that are relics from the previous war, and aircraft that best belong in a museum.

The navy's anti-submarine measures also lacked foresight. They were created under the assumption that the enemy would adopt the same strategies. Our submarines are used for reconnaissance, and we withdraw them at night so we do not compromise our position. But it is unquestionable that the Germans are not using their U-boats for the same purposes. They have used their U-boats for the sole purpose of seizing their prey, and they do not withdraw at night, so they can lie in wait in the darkness. We have not developed any anti-submarine measures, since the Navy did not foresee the possibility that submarines could be used for the purpose of attacking shipping.

The Atlantic fleet has also been too dependent on ASDIC, and I believe that recent events have proved its unreliability. ASDIC seemed good in theory - a transmitter that sent an impulse through water, in order to detect submerged targets, seemed incredible at its time of inception. However, while the Defense advisory Committee placed all its faith in ASDIC prior to the war, ASDIC has had limited utility in this situation. The Navy failed to test it before the war, and have had no prior experience of ASDIC in non-controlled conditions. Any competent submariner could have told you that the difference in temperatures due to the depth of the water would affect the sound waves.

ASDIC's range is limited to 1500 yards, and it is ineffective in rough weather and at speeds above twenty knots. The night raids have hit us hard partially because of our reliance on ASDIC – it cannot distinguish between submarine and non-submarine targets, and detect surfaced U-boats. The only way of detecting a surfaced U-boat is by sight, but the dark night and the shadows of the ships in convoy have eliminated even that method. 60% of our convoys have been sunk at night. There have been a few near misses and narrow escapes from the U-boats, but these are mainly due to defective German torpedoes. We must act soon before the Germans can devise improved magnetic and contact firing pistols.

The Navy has been lax in our anti-submarine preparations, as pre-war preparations have focused on defeating surface forces and battle fleets. The assumption that U-boats would only attack by day has been proven false, and ASDIC has been proven to be unreliable. We are undeniably at a disadvantage, and we must reallocate our resources in the Atlantic campaign and reinforce the escort fleet to avoid utter failure.

If the Atlantic operations continue along these lines, Britain will lose.

Karl-Heinze Moehle, Commander, U-123, (December 1940)

Karl-Heinze Moehle, 

Commander, U-123

December, 1940

Our orders have been carried out successfully. I am glad to report that on the morning of 23 November, our U-boat decided to attack convoy OB-244 and in just five hours, we hit the bastards hard with five ships being sunk for a total of 23, 084 tons. The men are very glad, and we have been commended by the High Command. Although our submarine had collided with a sunken ship and we had to return to base, our task has been fulfilled. We shall continue to aim to sink more enemy tonnage.